Virendra Kumar
College of ComputingGeorgia Institute of Technology
266 Ferst Drive, # 2124
Atlanta, GA 30332
virendra[AT]cc[DOT]gatech[DOT]edu
About me
I am a 2nd year PhD student at
College of Computing, Georgia Tech. My research interests are
in cryptography and information security. My advisor is Prof. Alexandra
Boldyreva. I
also work with Prof. Yael Tauman
Kalai. I am
a member of Theory at
Georgia Tech.
I am visiting Symantec Research Labs, Mountain View
during Summer '08. At Symantec, I am working with Zulfikar
Ramzan and Sanjay Sawhney. David
Cash, Adam O'Neill,
and Akshay Wadia
are my academic brothers. Vipul Goyal, Abhishek Jain,
and Omkant Pandey are
friends from my undergraduate institution, also working in
cryptography. Before coming to Georgia
Tech., I
finished my undergraduate studies in electrical engineering from IT-BHU in 2006.
This is Symantec's confidential technical report and has a very restricted access.
Publications
- Crypto Analysis of Symantec's Norton Confidential.
This is Symantec's confidential technical report and has a very restricted access.
- Identity-based Encryption with Efficient Revocation. With Alexandra Boldyreva and Vipul Goyal.
- Provable-Security Analysis of Authenticated Encryption in Kerberos. With Alexandra Boldyreva.
In Proc. 2007
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland '07), pp.
92-97.
We analyze the encryption schemes used in Kerberos. Although, most of the options suggested in the current version are sound for which we provide security proofs under standard assumptions, we point out flaws in the so called “General Profile” and suggest easy to implement modifications to provably fix them. For a widely deployed protocol like Kerberos, such provable security guarantees can go a long way in the standardization process.
We analyze the encryption schemes used in Kerberos. Although, most of the options suggested in the current version are sound for which we provide security proofs under standard assumptions, we point out flaws in the so called “General Profile” and suggest easy to implement modifications to provably fix them. For a widely deployed protocol like Kerberos, such provable security guarantees can go a long way in the standardization process.
- A New Protocol to Counter Online Dictionary Attacks. With Vipul Goyal, Mayank Singh, Ajith Abraham, and Sugata Sanyal.
In Computers
& Security,
vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 114-120, 2006.
In this paper, we propose an authentication protocol which is easy to implement without any infrastructural changes and yet prevents online dictionary attacks. Our protocol uses only one way hash functions and eliminates online dictionary attacks by implementing a challenge-response system. The protocol is perfectly stateless and thus less vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks.
In this paper, we propose an authentication protocol which is easy to implement without any infrastructural changes and yet prevents online dictionary attacks. Our protocol uses only one way hash functions and eliminates online dictionary attacks by implementing a challenge-response system. The protocol is perfectly stateless and thus less vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks.
- CompChall: Addressing Password Guessing Attacks. With Vipul Goyal, Mayank Singh, Ajith Abraham, and Sugata Sanyal.
In Proc.
International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing
(ITCC '05), pp. 739-744.
This is the conference version of the paper "A New Protocol to Counter Online Dictionary Attacks".
This is the conference version of the paper "A New Protocol to Counter Online Dictionary Attacks".
Relevant Coursework
-
CS 6260 - Applied Cryptography: Taught by Prof. Alexandra Boldyreva, Fall 2006.
-
CS 6505 - Computability, Algorithms and Complexity: Taught by Prof. Yan Zong Ding, Spring 2007.
-
CS 6238 - Secure Computer Systems: Taught by Prof. Mustaque Ahamad, Spring 2007.
-
CS 6262 - Network Security: Taught by Prof. Jonathon T. Giffin, Fall 2007.
-
CS 8803FC - Foundations of Cryptography: Taught by Prof. Yael Tauman Kalai, Spring 2008.